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The Transfer and Partition of
Remainders in Missouri*
INTRODUCTORY

The common law gave to vested remainders many of the qualities of present estates, and most of the questions arising in
connection with their transfer have long been free from difficulty.
But contingent remainders occupied such a precarious place in
the law long after they were first recognized as legal interests,1
that all questions as to their transferability were approached with
exceeding reluctance. The contingent remainderman had only
a mere possibility of an estate, and the employment of such a
description was in itself sufficient to conjure difficulty, for pos.ibility to the common law lawyer was a dangerous word. A
dealing in possibilities smacked of maintenance and its conse-

quent taint. It is not surprising, therefore, that when all conveyances of interests in land were formal and restricted and when
uncertain. future interests were not favored, artificial rules for the
alienation of contingent remainders took root; and although conveyances have been freed from most of the feudal restrictions and
uncertain interests have come into greater favor, the force of the
artificial rules has not entirely spent itself. A special treatment
of the transfer of remainders seems to be justified, therefore,
with especial reference to a few recent Missouri decisions. 2
*The substance of this article appeared in 26 Yale Law Journal
24, in November, 1916, and is republished with the permission of the
editor of that magazine. The discussion of Shelton v. Bragg (1916)
189 S. W. 1174 is entirely new, the case having been decided since the
original article appeared.
1. The recognition of contingent remainders was probably prior
to 1430. Gray, Perpetuities (3d ed.) § 13'4. But it is possible that contingent remainders to uncertain persons were not allowed until later.
See 14 Law Quart. Rev. 234, 238.
2. Particularly, Hauser v. Murray (1914) 256 Mo. 58, 165 S. W.
376; Eckle v. Ryland (1914) 256 Mo. 424, 165 S. W. 1035; Tevis v.
(3)
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In dealing with contingent remainders it is necessary to keep
constantly in mind the nature of the contingency, and it will be
convenient to distinguish two classes of contingencies: (1) those
which affect the determination of the person who may come into
the enjoyment of the estate, and (2) those which affect the
completeness of the title accruing to an as;certained person in
whose favor the limitation was made. Typifying the first class,
a devise to A for life, remair-der in fee to the heirs of X, a living
person-no definite person can be said to have the contingent
remainder because of the possibility that so many various persons
may come to be clothed with the right; lypifying the second
class, a devise to A for life, remainder in f(:e to B if he survive
X-the remainder is in B, although it is an incomplete interest
pending the contingency. If a remainder is conferred on B,
who may be heir apparent of X, on the contingency that he
survive X as heir, we have a case clearly of the second class,
although it closely resembles the typical case of the first class.
This distinction was made ".y Fearne throughout his treatise,3
and it is important that it be observed in this study for historical
reasons at least. The distinction is sometimes expressed by
referring to B in cases of the second class as having "a vested
interest in a contingent remc-inder, "' 4 but bezause of its tendency
toward confusion that expression should be avoided.
The various methods of transfer will be treated under the
titles of intestate succession, testamentary disposition and inter
vivos alienation. Partition is really a method of transfer but
will be treated separately.
Tevis (1914) 259 Mo. 19, 167 S. W. 1003; and Stockwell v. Stockwell
(1914) 262 Mo. 671, 172 S.W. 23; Shelton v. tragg (1916) 189 S. W.
1174.

3. Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 370. From Fearne, it was

adopted in Shaw Fletcher, Contingent and Executory Interests, p. 172.

Fearne's fourth class of contingent remainderm was "to a person not
ascertained or not in being."

See 2 Preston, .A.bstracts, p. 95.

4. See Putnam v. Story (1882) 132 Mass. 205; 2 Washburn, Real
Property (6th ed.) § 1557; Love v. Linstedt (Or., 1915) 147 Pac. 935.
In Rozier v. Graham (1898) 1.46 Mo. 352, 48 S. W. 470, the court used
the expression, "Tho a fee may vest as a contiagent remainder." The
distinction is sometimes expressed by a refeience to the contingent
remainder's vesting "in interest" while yet con*;ingent. See Cummings
v. Stearns (1894) 151 Mass. 560; Huntress v. Allen (1907) 195 Mass. 226.

TRANSFER AND PARTITION OF REMAINDERS IN MISSOURI

5

TRANSFER BY INTESTATE SUCCESSION

A vested remainder was descendible at common law 5 and will
of course pass to the heirs of the remainderman under the
modern statute of descents." In Jones v. Waters,7 a vested
remainder was sold by an administrator under order of the
county court. In Wommack v. Whitmore s land was conveyed
to X in trust for A for life, remainder to her children; B, a
daughter of A, predeceased A, leaving a daughter, C, who was
her heir and C predeceased A, leaving her father (B's husband)
as her heir: it was held that C's father took the remainder given
to B, by descent from C upon whom it had descended from B.
This case is of interest because of the rule of the common law
as stated by Fearne,9 that one "who claims a fee simple by
descent from one who was first purchaser of the reversion or
remainder expectant on a freehold estate, must make himself
heir to such purchaser, at the time when that reversion or
remainder falls into possession." While the Missouri court
5. Watkins, Descents, p. 4.
6. Revised Statutes 1909, § 332, "when any person having title to
any real estate of inheritance." Reinders v. Koppelmann (1878) 68
Mo. 482; Waddell v. Waddell (1889) 99 Mo. 338, 12 S. W. a49; Chew v.
Keller (1889) 100 Mo. 362, 13 S. W. 395. A reversion is a descendible
interest under this statute. Payne v. Payne (1893) 119 Mo. 174, 24 S.
W. 781.
7. (1853) 17 Mo. 587. The "county court" was probably the probate court.
8. (1874) 58 Mo. 448. Nothing turns on the fact that the remainder was equitable.
9. Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 561. See Goodright v.
Searle (1756) 2 Wils. 29, upon which Fearne's statement is based, and
Doe d. Andrew v. Hutton (1804) 3 B. & P. 643, where it Is cited with
approval. See also Shaw Fletcher, Contingent and Executory Interests,
p. 174. Goodright v. Searle was followed by Story, J., In Barnitz's
Lessee v. Casey (1813) 7 Cranch 456. For comment on this case, see
Bingham, Descents, p. 223. See also Buck v. Lontz (1878) 49 Md. 439;
Garrison v. Hill (1894) 79 Md. 75; Jenkins v. Bonsall (1911) 116 Md.
629, where the rule was applied to a remainder in personalty; Lawrence
v. Pitt (1854) 46 N. C. 3414; Payne v. Rosser (1875) 53 Ga. 662. But
outside of Maryland the tendency of modern decisions is away from the
rule of the common law as stated by Fearne, and where possible It
will be found that the statute of descents has abrogated the rule. See
Early v. Early (1904) 134 N. C. 258; Oliver v. Powell (1901) 114 Ga.
592; North v. Graham (1908) 235 Ill. 178. See also 3 Illinois Law Rev.
185. For the rule in England since the Wills Act of 1837, see Ingilby
v. Amcotts (1856) 21 Beav. 585.
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clearly did not have Fearne's statement in mind, the result of
the decision is probably not consistent with an application of the
rule, for B's husband was probably not heir to B at the time of
A's death. The court seems to have been of the opinion that it
was unnecessary for one claiming a remainder by descent to
make himself heir to the first taker of the remainder as of the
time of its vesting in possession, and this seems far more satisfactory than the artificial rule of descent which would have the
effect of converting a vested remainder into a contingent remainder in the hands of the first remainderman's heir. 10 The
terms of the Missouri statute of descents offer sufficient justification for repudiating the old rule, for the statutory descent is
from one "having title."
A contingent remainder was descendible at common law wherever the person was certain, i. e., where the contingency did not
involve a determination of the person who was to take. Thus, a
devise to A for life, remainder to B and his heirs if C survive A;
B clearly has a descendible interest during the lifetime of C and
A, although it will of course be defeated by C's failure to survive A. But the nature of the contingency may involve a
survival of the remainderman beyond a certain time, and it is
equally clear that such a remainderman has no descendible
interest prior to such survival, even though he be an ascertained
person: for example, a devise to A for life, remainder to B and
his heirs if B survive A-obviously B has no interest which can
descend to his heirs prior to his survival of A, i. e., prior to its
becoming an estate in possession, for B's death during A's lifetime will entirely preclude the vesting of the remainder. Such
a contingent remainder is not descendible because of the nature
10. In Shaw Fletcher, Contingent and Executory Interests, p. 174,
it is said that a remainder "to B and his heirs" must pass to one who

is heir to B at the time of its vesting in possession because of the
limitation itself; but this seems to neglect the principle that the words

"and his heirs" are words of limitation of B's estate only. Cf. Golladaiy
v. Knock (1908) 235 Mo. 412, 413. A more plausible statement of the

rule is to be found In Watkins, Descents, p. 118. The rule had its
origin in the 6ommon law rule that descent should be traced from the

person last actually seised, or from the first purchaser.

See Early

v. Early (1904) 134 N. C. 258, 265. The common law maxim seisina
facit stipwitem was expressly repudiated by LEwis, P. J., in McKee
v. Cottle (1879) 6 Mo. App. 416, 419.
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of the contingency.1 1 If land is devised to A for life, remainder
to the unborn son of B (a single person), it is unnecessary to
deal with any question of descendibility of the remainder prior
to its becoming vested. If the devise is to A for life, remainder
to the heirs of X, clearly, also, no question can arise as to the
descendibility of the remainder while it is contingent, for the
death of a possible remainderman during the life of X would
preclude his being an heir and thus destroy the possibility of his
becoming the remainderman.
But more difficulty is encountered when the remainder is conferred on an unascertaine-l person or persons, and where the
death of a certain person or persons is not determinative of his
or their being the person or persons who may later be ascertained
to be the object or objects of the limitation. Thus, a devise to A
for life, remainder in fee to the youngest child of X born prior
to A's death; X has two children B and C; has C, the younger of
them, a contingent remainder? So long as X lives, he may have
other children. C seems to have a contingency of a vested remainder rather than a remainder on a contingency. 12 This distinction
is slight, if not fanciful,' 3 but it has been seized upon and made
the basis for a supposed rule that a remainder to an unascertained person is not descendible. 14 This rule has been recognized
11. This exception is clearly stated in Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 364. See also Hennessy v. Patterson (1881) 85 N. Y. 91; Brown
v. Williams (1858) 5 R. I. 308.
12.' It may be likened to an expectancy of succession to an ancestor's property as his heir, during the ancestor's lifetime. It would
seem therefore to fall within Challis' classification of "absolutely bare
possibilities" as opposed to "possibilities coupled with an interest,"
which latter phrase includes the ordinary contingent remainders. See
Challis, Real Property (3d ed.) p. 76, note. See also 1 Preston, Estates,
p. 76; 2 Preston, Abstracts, pp. 95, 204.
13. See Parkhurstv. Smith (1741) Willes 327, 338; Doe d. Calkin
v. Tomkinson (1813) 2 M. & S., 165; Challis, Real Property (3d ed. p.
234. In Doe d Calkin v. Tomkinson, Lord Ellenborough asked, "How
can a person be said to have a contingent interest, when it is uncertain
whether he is the person who will be entitled to have it or not." In
1 Preston, Estates, p. 76, the distinction Is made the basis for a division between possibilities coupled with an interest and those not
coupled with an interest. See also 2 Preston, Abstracts, pp. 95, 204.
14. Watkins, Descents, p. 4; Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p.
370; Doe dZ.Calkin v. Tomkinson (1813) 2 M. & S. 165. Cf. Roe. d.
Noden v. Griffith (1767) 1 W. Bl., 605; Leake, Property in Land (2d
ed.) p. 241 n.; 2 Preston, Abstracts, p. 95.
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by many American writers, 15 but Professor Kales, whose opinion
is entitled to great weight, seems to recognize no such exception
to the general rule that contingent remainders are descendible
unless the death of the remainderman precludes the later vesting
of the remainder. 16 Invariably, when the supposed rule is stated,
it is connected with a discussion of cases in which the death of
the remainderman would preclude a latter vesting. It is doubtful
whether the rule has been applied in any case where the contingency did not have to do with the remainderman's surviving the
particular tenant. In the case supposed, if X should die without
having had other children, C's death before X ought not to result
in a defeat of the gift to X's youngest child. Yet this would be
the effect of applying the supposed rule that a remainder to an
unascertained person is not descendible. It is submitted that the
authorities do not clearly establish such a rule and that its application at the present time would mean an unfortunate revival of
the feudal refinements as to possibilities.
The Missouri cases on the subject are disappointing because of
their failure to notice the distinctions above made. In Delassus
15. 2 Washburn, Real Property (6th ed.) § 1557; 4 Kent, Commentaries (14th ed.) p. 261; Tiffany, Real Property, § 129. In Brown
v. Williams (1858) 5 R. I. 309, Ames, C. J., approved the distinction
by saying that "if the contingency is to decide who is to be the object of
the contingent limitation, as the person, or of the persons, to or
amongst whom the contingent or future interest Is directed, as it cannot be determined In whom the interest is, until the contingency happens, no one can claim before the contingency decides the matter,
that any interest Is vested in him to descend from, and hence to be
transferred or devised by him." see also Pelletreau v. Jackson (1833)
11 Wendell 110; Roundtree v. Rounf tree (1887) 26 S. C. 450; Mohn
v. Mohn (1910) 148 Ia. 288; Fisher v. Wagner (1909) 109 Md. 443.
The Georgia statute provides for the descent of a contingent remainder
"when the contingency is not as to the person but as to the event."
Park's Code, § 3677. See Morse v. Proper (1888) 82 Ga. 13.
16. Kales, ,Future Interests In Illinois, § 72, n. 27. In Re Cresswell (1883) 24 Ch. D. 102, Kay, J., said, "As far as I can discover, the
only case in which a contingent future interest is not transmissible
is where the being in existence when the contingency happens is an
essential part of the description of the person who is to take." This
Is quoted in 2 Jarman, Wills (6th ed.) 1353. The supposed necessity
that the remainderman be ascertained finds no countenance from Jarman. The strongest authority for the supposed rule is to be found
in Preston's works. 2 Preston, Abstracts, pp. 95, 205; 1 Preston, Estates, p. 76. In Chess' Appeal (1878) 87 Pa. St. 362, it is said that
a contingent remainder is transmissible unless the contingency relates
to the capacity of the remainderman to take. Cf., Clarke v. Fay (1910)
205 Mass. 228.
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v. Gatewood,17 there was a devise to the testator's widow for life
and at her death to the testator's "children that are alive, or their
bodily children." One son of the testator predeceased his mother
leaving a widow and one son, and the latter died before the
termination of the life estate. The court held that the remainder
was contingent in the testator's children, but it would seem to
have become vested in the "bodily children" of any child dying
during the lifetime of the testator's widow. On this latter point,
the court was by no means clear; it seems to have treated the
remainder of the "bodily children" as contingent on their surviving the testator's widow, for it held that the widow of the
testator's son took nothing by, descent from her child upon the
latter's death during the lifetime of the testator's widow. If the
remainder of the "bodily children" was contingent, the grandson's death during the continuance of the life estate precluded
a later vesting. In any event, therefore, the case stands for
nothing as to the descendibility, of a contingent remainder, although the court seems to have thought it was applying a rule
that contingent remainders are not descendible.15
The statement was made obiter in Payne v. Payne 19 that "a
remainder can only be acquired by purchase, and never by
descent;" but this should be taken to refer to the creation of
remainders, rather than to their devolution after creation. In
Sullivan v. Garesche,20 the remainder was given to "surviving
children" and it was held that this meant surviving at the time

of the termination of the particular estate, so that the death of a
possible remainderman theretofore necessarily precluded the vesting of the interest and there was nothing to descend. In Hauser
17. (1880) 71 Mo. 371. The situation in Ruddell v. Wren (1904)
208 Ill. 508 was very similar, though the remainder was more clearly
contingent. Whether the contingency was such as to preclude the
descent of the remainder, quaere. The court's opinion clearly made
it so.
18. The court cited Bingham, Descents, pp. 222, 223, where the
opinion is expressed that contingent remainders are not descendible,
and the authorities are reviewed very speciously, there being no citation of Fearne. In view of the comment here made on Delassus v. Gatewood, it is submitted that the case was improperly cited in Washburn,
Real Property (6th ed.) § 1557 note. Cf. Rindquist v. Young (1892)
112 Mo. 25, 20 S. W. 159.
19. (1893') 119 Mo. 174, 24 S. W. 781.
20. (1910) 229 Mo. 496, 129 S. W. 949.
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v. Murray,2 1 the flat statement was made that "contingent remainders are not descendible," but again the court was considering a
remainder to the "bodily heirs" of a life tenant and the person
from whom descent was claimed failed to become an heir by his
non-survival.
These descisions leave the question of descendibility unsettled
in Missouri. But it is submitted that the way is still open to the
Missouri court to declare that whenever the person to take is
ascertained a contingent remainder is descendible unless the survival of the deceased is itself a part of the contingency. The
law in other states is settled this far.22

It would undoubtedly

be simpler if it were unnecessary to add, "whenever the person
to take is ascertained," and it is submitted that this would involve
no departure from the common law as it has actually been applied
by the courts in England and America. If a contingent remainder
is held to descend, it may do so, however, subject to the rule of
23
Goodright v. Searle noted above.
Since there is no seisin of a contingent remainder, there can be
no dower or curtesy in it, and even the owner of a vested
24
remainder does not have seisin so as to entitle his wife to dower.
21. (1913) 256 Mo. 58, 97, 165 S. W. 376. The court cites for the
statement quoted Delassus v. Gatewood, already discussed, and Dickerson v. Dickerson (1907) 211 Mo. 483, 110 S. W. 1100; in the latter
case no question of descendibility was involved. In Romjue v. Randolph (1912) 166 Mo. App. 87, 148 S. W. 185, ELLISON, 3., seems to
have admitted that a contingent remainder Is descendible.
The same confusion seems to exist in the Illinois decisions. See
Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, § 73.
22. See Winslow v. Goodwin (1884) 7 Metcalf (Mass.) 363; Clark
v. Cox (1894) 115 N. C. 93; Tiffany, Real Property, § 129; Kales,
Future Intereste In Illinois, § 72.
23. Ante, note 9. See Barnitz v. Casey (1813) 7 Cranch 456. Cf.
Fisher v. Wagner (1909) 109 Md. 243, 251. The Missouri statute provides a course of descent "where any person having title to any real
estate of inheritance" dies. Ante, note 5. A contingent remainderman
would seem to be euch a person, in view of the interpretation of a
similar expression In the statute on conveyances made in Godman v.
Simmons (1892) 113 Mo. 122, 20 S. W. 972.
24. Scribner, Dower (2d ed.) p. 321; Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 346; Warren v. Williams (1887) 25 Mo. App. 22; Cochran
v. Thomas (1895) 131 Mo. 258, 33 S. W. 6; Martin v. Trail (1897) 142
Mo. 85, 43 S. W. 655; Cox v. Boyce (1899) 152 Mo. 576, 54 S. W. 467;
Von Arb v. Thomas (1901) 163 Mo. 33, 63 S. W. 94; Majors v. Cryts
(1911) 240 Mo. 386, 144 S. W. 769. In Payne v. Payne (1893) 119 Mo.
174, 24 S. W. 781, It was held that the widow of a reversioner had no
(lower in the reversion. But cf., McKee v. Cottle (1879) 6 Mo. App. 416.
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TRANSFER BY TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION

It would seem that if a remainder is descendible it should also
be devisable, 2 5 but devisability depends upon statute and is to
some extent a question of statutory construction. The early
English Statute of Wills gave a limited power of testamentary
disposition to persons "having or which hereafter shall have any
manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments, holden," etc. 26 This
was for many years construed not to include contingent remainders, the word "having" being read to mean "seized of;"'27 but
the contrary has now long been held in England and the statute
is held to mean "that every person who has a valuable interest in
lands shall have the power of disposing of it by will." 28 The
more modern Wills Act 29 is quite explicit in permitting the devise
of any interest which would descend and of any contingent interest "whether the testator may or may not be ascertained as the
person or one of the persons in whom the same may respectively
become vested." This would seem to authorize the devise of a
contingent remainder which might not be descendible because of
the non-ascertainment of the person in whom it may vest, but
English opinion does not seem clear on the point.30
Of course a contingent remainder cannot be devised by one
whose death precludes the later vesting of the interest, 3 1 and it
seems that the same objection may, be made to the devise of a
25. See Roe d. Noden v. Griffith (1767) 1 W. Blackstone 605;
lngtlby v. Amcotts (1856) 21 Beav. 585. Descendibility is not an accurate test of devisability. Rights of entry for condition broken are
descendible but probably not devisable. See 5 Law Series, Missouri
Bulletin, p. 1.5; 9 Columbia Law Review, 548.
26. (1540) 32 Henry VIII, c. 1. As amended in 34 and 35 Henry
VIII, c. 5, § 4, this statute expressly included remainders.
27. Bishop v. Fountaine (1696) &Lev. 427; Ives v. Legge (1743)
3 D. & E. 488. These cases are discussed in Fearne, Contingent Re-

mainders, p. 366; Shaw Fletcher, Contingent and Executory Interests,
p. 180.
28. Jones v. Roe (1789)
miinders, pp. 366 et seq.
29. (1837) 1 Vict. c. 26.

3' D. & E. 88; Fearne, Contingent Re-

30. A contrary view is expressed in Shaw Fletcher, Contingent

and Executory Interests, p. 181. But see 1 Jarman, Wills (6th ed.) p.

80.

Fearne may have considered such a remainder as devisable in

equity independently of statute. Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 548.
31. Brown v. Williams (1858) 5 R. I. 309.
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remainder, where the person to take is not ascertained, as was
made to its descendibility above.32 But subject to these exceptions, it is now generally held that vested and contingent remainders are freely devisable, 33 and in some states this is confirmed
34
by statute.
The Missouri statute permits a man to devise "all his estate,
real, personal and mixed and all interest therein," and a woman
to devise "her land, tenements or any descendible interests
therein.135 The decisions have not closely analysed the effect of
this statute. There can be no doubt as to the devisability of a
vested remainder,3 6 but there is much to lead the unwary to conclude that contingent remainders cannot be devised. Under the
terms of the statute there may be a difference whether the devise
is by a man or a woman, and only descendible remainders may
be devisable by a woman, thus opening up the uncertainty as to
what is descendible. However, it seems unlikely that the court
would favor such a distinction.
In Eckle v. Ryland,37 the court recognized the practical impossibility of devising a contingent remainder where "the same event
which makes the will effective makes it impossible for the con32. But Professor Kales disapproves of any such reason for nondevisability. See his Future Interests in Illinois, § 73 n. Cf. 2 Preston,
Abstracts, p. 95. In 1 Preston, Estates, p. 76, it is said that a remainder
to an unascertalned person is a possibility not coupled with an Interest
and is not devisable. In Fisher v. Wagner (1909) 109 Md. 243, 21 L.
R. A. 121, the court emphasized the fact that the contingency did not
affect the ascertainment of the person.
33. Loring v. Arnold (1887) 15 R. I. 428; Chess' Appeal (1878)
87 Pa. St. 362; Kenyon v. See (1884) 94 N. Y. 563; Fisher v. Wagner
(1909) 109 Md. 243. See also Tiffany, Real Property, § 129; 9
Columbia Law Rev. 546.
34. See Reeves, Real Property, § 904. In Illinois, the statute is
not explicit, but contingent remainders are probably devisable. Cf.
Harvard College v. Balch (1898) 171 Il. 275; and the comment In
Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, § 73. The Georgia statute making
contingent remainders descendible "when the contingency is not as to
the person," Parks' Code § 3677, seems to apply by analogy to devises.
Morse v. Proper (1888) 82 Ga. 13.
35. Revised Statutes, 1909, §§ 535, 536. An early Missouri statute
authorized the devise of all "estate, right, title and interest in possession, reversion or remainder." Revised Statutes, 1825, p. 790. But
this wording was dropped In 1835. Revised Statutes, 1835, p. 617.36. Waddell v. Waddell (1889) 99 Mo. 338, 12 S. W. 349; Eckle
v. Ryland (1913) 256 Mo. 4,24, 165 S. W. 1035 (semble); Tiffany, Real
Property, § 129.
37. (1913) 256 Mo. 424, 440, 165 S. W. 1035.
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tingency to happen," i. e., where the testator's death precludes the
vesting of any interest. Tevis v. Tevis55 presents more difficulty.
A testator disposed of certain land during the life of his son John,
and provided that on the death of John, another son, Nestor, or
his heirs, should have the right to purchase the land for a fixed
sum of money, and that the money or the land, depending. on
Nestor's election, should "vest in the heirs of the body of John,
and if there shall be no heirs of his body then living, the money
or the land shall pass to and vest in" the testator's heirs at law.
There was nothing in the will to refer the determination of the
testator's heirs to the time of John's death, and it would seem
that the will had the effect of creating a contingent remainder in
the heirs of John's body subject to Nestor's right of purchase
(which did not effect a conversion), and that subject to the vesting of this remainder, the heirs of the testator took the reversion
by.descent and not by devise,39 with the result that upon John's
death without bodily heirs the devisee of one of the testator's
heirs who predeceased John should have taken that heir's share
which was vested and therefore devisable. But the court held
that such a devisee took nothing, saying that the persons who
were to take on John's death without heirs of his body "could
not be determined until" that contingency happened. This would
make it seem that the court referred the determination of the
testator's heirs to the time of John's death in spite of its previous
declarations to the contrary, and if this is true the result of the
case is sound for the devisor never qualified as a member of
the class of objects of the limitation. But in the next breath the
court said that "such interest was therefore a contingent interest
and not devisable prior to the death of John," referring to Eckle
v. Ryland. If it was contingent on the death of John without
38. (1914) 259 Mo. 19, 167 S. W. 1003.
39. Where A devises land to B for life, and remainder to C if C
survive B, A's heirs take the reversion by descent subject to the contingent remainder; Plunket v. Holmes (1658) 1 Lev. 11; Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 351; and if A's will purports to confer the remainder utpon them it is so far void, for since they would take the
same interest by descent, the law gives no effect to that portion of the
will. Challis, Real Property (3d ed.) p. 239; Sanders, Uses (4th ed.)
p. 133; Leake, Property In Land (2d ed.) p. 124. It is not, therefore,
a case of alternate contingent remainders but a case of a descending
reversion which Is subject to B's contingent remainder.
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heirs. of his body, such a contingency should not render it nondevisable. It is impossible to know what was meant, and in view
of the court's failure to give any proper consideration to the general question of the devisability of a contingent remainder, Tezis
v. Tevis must not be taken to stand for the proposition that contingent remainders are not devisable.4 0.
With this scant authority, the question is by no means settled
in Missouri and it is open to the court to hold that contingent
remainders are devisable wherever the person to take is ascertained, unless the death of the testator is an event which precludes the vesting of the interest. For the reason stated above,
it is submitted that it should not be necessary, to include "whereever the person to take is ascertained."
TRANSFER BY INTER

Vrvos

ALIENATION

Volwntary Alienation. The common law permitted the free
alienation of vested remainders by grant, but it did not allow
contingent remainders to be transferred by grant. 41 As early as
Lampet's Case,42 it was thought that a possibility could not be
assigned, for like the assignment of a chose in action it would
be the "occasion of multiplying of contentions and suits of great
oppression of the people," to use Lord Coke's expression.43 It
was not unnatural that contingent remainders should be put with
40. The various syllabi to Tevis v. Tevis in 259 Mo. 19 and 167 S.
W. 1003 may easily mislead the casual reader. It seems altogether
improbable that the court had in mind the rule of Goodright v. Searle
noted above, though this is a possible explanation. But even that rule
does not preclude a devise by an heir of a remainderman prior to the
termination of the particular estate. See Ingilby v. Amcotts (1856) 21
Beav. 585.
41. Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 366. The common law
requirement of attornment to effectuate a grant of a reversion or remainder was abolished in 1705 by the statute of Anne, 4 Anne, e. 16,
§19, the substance of which was enacted in Missouri In 1845. Revised
Statutes 1845, c. 32, § 11, now Revised Statutes 1909, § 7925. See 8
Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 18.
42. (1612) 10 Coke, 48a.
43. It seems difficult to justify the statement in Williams, Real
Property (17th Int. ed.) p. 4,24, that the reason why a contingent remainder "so long remained Inalienable was simply because it had
never been thought worth while to make it alienable." This reason
was accepted, however, by BAKEWELL, J., in Lackland v. Nevins (1877)
3 Mo. App. 3.35, 339.
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choses in action as mere possibilities at a time when they yet commanded very little respect from the lawyers. But with their
greater security in the law, there came also some necessity of relaxing the rule against their alienability. It was early held that
a contingent remainder could be released. 44 If A conveys to
B for life, remainder to C and his heirs if D survives B, C
may release to A who has the reversion subject to the contingent
remainder and A will thereafter have the reversion as though
the contingent remainder had never created. 46 Such a release
operates by way of. extinguishment. It seems doubtful, however, whether C would have been permitted to release to B and
his heirs, for although most writers make no restriction on the
operation of the release, 46 it seems strange that C could release
to B when he could not grant to D, inasmuch as B's previous
interest would not be affected by the release. It would seem
proper to say that a contingent remainder may be released only
where the result will be its extinguishment, i. e., it may be released
only to that person whose interest would be defeated or postponed
by the vesting of the contingent remainder. 47 It seems doubtful,
too, whether a release can be operative when made by one who
is not certain to take on the contingency, i. e., where the remain48
der is to an unascertained person.
A contingent remainder was susceptible of transfer by fine or
common recovery operating by way of estoppel, 49 so as to bind
44. See Lampet's Case (1612) 10 Coke, 48a; and Marks v. Marks
(1718) 1 Strange, 129, 132.
45. See Williams, Real Property (21st Int. ed.) p. 422, where it is
said that "the law, whilst it tolerated conditions of reentry and contingent remainders, always gladly permitted such rights to be got rid
of by release, for the sake of preserving uninjured vested estates as
might happen to be subsisting."
46. 1 Preston, Estates, p. 89; Reeves, Real Property, § 904. See
16 Viner, Abridgement, p. 461.
47. This distinction has been expressed very clearly by Professor
Kales In 2 Illinois Law Rev, 48. in comment on the dictum in Ortmayer
v. Elcock (1907) 225 Ill. 342, that a contingent remainder may be released to the life tenant. The result reached in Jeffers v. Lampson
(1859) 10 Oh. St. 101, and In Miller v. Emans (1859) 19 N. Y. 384,
seems agreeable to It. The result in Smith v. Pencdell (1848) 19 Conn.
107 may be explained on the ground that the remainder was vested,
though the court thought it contingent.
48. See 16 Viner, Abridgement, 463; Shaw Fletcher, Contingent
and Executory Interests, p. 184. Cf., Miller v. Emans (1859) 19 N. Y.
384.
49. Fearne, Contingent Remainders, pp., 365, 366. In Doe d. Brune
v. Martin (1828) 8 B. & C. 524, Bayley, J., said that "a fine by a con-
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the interest which thereafter vested. Similarly, it would seem
that the American doctrine of estoppel by deed is applicable, so
that if one purports to convey land by a deed which contains
covenants sufficient to pass an after acquired title by estoppel,
he will not thereafter be permitted to assert a title upon the
happening of a contingency upon which an estate vested in him ;50
for the application of such an estoppel with such effect on a
contingent remainder, it would seem to be immaterial whether
the remainderman were ascertained at the time the deed was
executed. 51 It would seem that a bare quit-claim deed should
not create such an estoppel,5 2 although where it is clearly the
intention of the parties to pass a contingent interest and there is
a valuable consideration, a court of equity may later enforce such
a transaction as an agreement to convey, of which specific performance will be decreed after the happening of the contingency.5 3 This, indeed, is the meaning of the frequent statement
that contingent remainders may be assigned in equity. It would
seem essential to equity's enforcement that the conveyance disclose an unmistakable intent to pass the future interest. If an
estoppel is created, it is binding on the heir as well as on the
ancestor.

54

One of the first reforms accomplished, when the English law of
real property began to be overhauled, was to make contingent
tingent remainderman passes nothing, but leaves the right as it found
it, . . . . it operates by estoppel only." Cf. Doe d. Christmas v.
Oliver (1829)

10 B. & C. 181.

50. Robertson v. Wilson (1859) 38 N. H. 48; Walton v. Follansbee (1890) 131 111. 147. Cf., Stewart v. Neely (1891) 139 Pa. St. 309.
51. Robertson v. Wilson (1859) 38 N. H. 48; Tiffany, Real Property, § 129 n. Read v. Fogg (1872) 60 Maine 479, was such a case;
the holding that there was no estoppel was based on the absence of a
complete covenant of warranty. In Dougal v. Fryer (1831) 3 Mo. 40,
it was said that "to pas6 an estate by estoppel the party must have
had power to pass it by a direct conveyance." Quaere, does this apply
to contingent remainders in Missouri? Cf. Lewis v. Bogy (1850) 13 Mo.
365, 380; Valle v. Clemens (1852.) 18 Mo. 486; Ford v. Unity Church
Society (1893) 120 Mo. 498, 25 S. W. 394.
52. See however, Hannon v. Christopher (1881) 34 N. J. Eq. 459,
where a contrary view is expressed but not held.
53. Fearne, Contingent Remainders, p. 550; 3 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence (3d ed.) § 1286; Hannon v. Christopher (1881) 34 N.
J. Eq. 459. It is possible that a consideration of love and affection is
sufficient for this purpose. Fearne, Ibid., p. 549.
54. Weale v. Lower (1672) Poll. 54,
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remainders alienable. The Real Property Amendment Act 55 provides that "a contingent, an executory and a future interest, and
a possibility coupled with an interest

.

.

.

whether the object

of the gift or limitation of such interest or possibility, be or be
not ascertained

.

.

.

may be disposed of by deed."

It will

be noted that it was thought necessary to stipulate in this statute
concerning those cases in which the object or person is not
ascertained. The American statutes are usually less explicit,5 6
and in many states where contingent remainders are made alienable by statute a question may still arise as to the possibility of
alienation where the person who is to enjoy the estate on a
57
contingency is not ascertained.
The Missouri statute, first passed in 1865,58 authorizes the
conveyance of "lands or of any estate or interest therein." Prior
to 1865, contingent remainders were probably alienable in Missouri only, as at common law, i. e., by release operating by way
of extinguishment and by some method of conveyance which
would create an estoppel; but it seems that the Supreme court
was not called on to decide the question, and it is practically
impossible that a case should now arise which would involve it.
In Lackland v. Nevins, 59 there was a devise in 1853 to a trustee
55.

177.

(1'845)

8 & 9 Vict., c. 106. See Challis, Real Property (3d. ed.) p.

56. For instance, the New York statute which has been copied in
several states merely provides that "an expectant estate is descendible,
devisable, and alienable, in the same manner as an estate in possession." N. Y. Real Property Laws, § 49. See Reeves, Real Property,
§ 904 note. For statutes of other states see Stimson, American Statute
Law, § 1420.
57. This question seems to have been recognized by the court in
Putnam v. Story (1882) 132 Mass. 205, although it was held that a presumptive heir could alien his interest under a will which conferred a remainder on "heirs." See also Whipple v. Fairchild) (1885) 139 Mass.
262. In Massachusetts, contingent remainders seem to be alienable
without reference to statute. See Tiffany, Real Property, § 129. In
Golladay v. Knock 235 Ill. 41]2, 423, there was a devise to A for life
with a contingent remainder to B and his heirs, B died during A's
life time, and one of his heirs conveyed his interest in the remainder
and later predeceased A. It was held that the conveyance was ineffective Sed quaere.
,58. Revised Statutes 1865, c. 109, § 1. Now Revised Statutes 1909,
§ 2787. There can be no doubt of the free alienability of vested remainders under this statute. Byrne v. France (1895) 131 Mo. 639, 33
S. W. 178. On the general subject of methods of conveyance in Missouri, see 8 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 11, et seq.
59. (1877) 3 Mo. App. 335. The will in this case was construed
in Hall v. Howdeshell (1863) 33 Mo. 475.
2
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for A for life, and if her husband survive her, remainder to her
brother and sisters. 0 In 1854, one sister conveyed all her "right,
title and interest, whether in law or equity, as well in possession
or in expectancy," for a valuable consideration and it was held
that her contingent remainder passed, although it was not clear
whether it was intended that this result be rested on the statute,6 1'
or achieved apart from statute, or whether the court was giving
specific performance to the deed, treating it as a contract to convey. The statute of 1865 was not in force when the deed was
executed, and could not have applied. The court denounced the
doctrine that contingent remainders are inalienable, as "contrary
to the policy of our sytsem," but it is submitted that the result of
the case must be explained as a specific enforcement in equity of
the agreement found in the deed. It is improbable that other
cases of attempts to convey contingent remainders prior to 1865
will arise in the future, and any attempt made since 1865 can
probably be rested on the statute.
Godman v. Simmons6 2 arose under the statute of 1865; land
had been conveyed to A for life, remainder to her bodily heirs;
A's children conveyed their interests, one deed purporting to pass
the fee simple, one purporting to pass all interest "whether present or prospective, vested or contingent," and one deed was in
the ordinary language of a quit-claim. A was survived by these
children, 63 and it was held in this action of ejectment that their
deeds were all effective to pass their contingent remainders. The
court was undoubtedly applying the statute of 1865, although it
professed to be acting independently of it.64

No special attention

60.

It was thought to be unnecessary to decide whether it was a

61.

The court referred to Wagner's Statutes, p. 272, § 1.

contingent remainder or an executory devise to the brothers and
sisters.

This

Is the same as Revised Statutes 1865, c. 109, § 1, which was not enacted
until eleven years after the execution of the deed in question.

62. (1892) 113 Mo. 122, 20 S. W. 972. See also Emmerson v.
Hughes (1892) 110 Mo. 627, 19 S. W. 979, where the same deed was
construed to have created an estate tail. This was criticized in 1 Law
Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 15. In Wood v. Kice (1890) 103 Mo. 329,
15 S. W. 623, the possibility of mortgaging a contingent remainder
seems to have been admitted.
63 It was held in Emmerson v. Hughes (1892) 110 Mo. 627, 19 S.
W. 979, that the deed of one child who failed to survive A passed
nothing.
64. BRAcE, J., who wrote the opinion, said: "This ancient common law rule-that contingent remainders are inalienable, like the
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was given by the court to the question whether a contingent
remainder could be conveyed when the person to take is not certain, although it was raised by counsel. 5 Since the case was
treated as one of an estate tail, though improperly so, this question may have been deemed less important by,the court. 66 The
dictum in Sikemeier v. Galzin seems to approve the same result
where no estate tail was involved. In Brown v. Fulkerson6 8 there
is a still further extension; land was devised to C and the heirs
of her body with a gift over if she died without such heirs. Upon
the death of C without heirs of her body, the estate would have
devolved on her heirs under the statute of 1845 ;89 but it was held
that the deed of C's nieces and nephews who were her heirs executed before C's death, had effectively conveyed their interests.
Here the relationship was remote, and the uncertainty as to the
persons to take the contingent remainder was greater than in
Godman v. Simmons, but the alienability of the remainder was
none the less upheld.
In Finley v. Babb,70 where the remainder was in the heirs of the
life tenant, it was held that it was conveyed by a deed executed
71
by a son before the death of the life tenant. In Clark v. Sires,
72
and in Parrishy. Treadway, the remainder was in the life tenrule that choses in action are not assignable-does not obtain in this
state; not because there has been a positive statute abolishing these
rules, but because they are out of harmony with its general affirmative
statute upon these subjects, and long since have ceased-if they ever
did exist-as rules governing the action of its citizens In the business
relations of life."
65. In White v. McPheeters (1882) 75 Mo. 286, NORTON, J., had
quoted with approval the statement in 2 Washburn, Real Property
(6th ed.) § 1557, that "if the contingency is in the person who is to
take, as where the remainder is limited to the heirs of one now alive,
there is no one who can make an effectual grant or devise of the remainder." The court in White v. McPheeters thought that the contingent remainder .in that case was an alienable interest.
66. There is still some doubt as to the nature of the statutory remainder in an estate tail, and this doubt may have Influenced the
court in Gotlman v. Simmons. See 1 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p.
19.
67. (1894) 124 Mo. 367, 27 S. W. 551.
68. (1894) 125 Mo. 400, 28 S. W. 632. Cf., Clarke v. Fay (1910)
205 Mass. 228.,
69. Brown v. Rogers (1894) 125 Mo. 392, 28 S. W. 630. For a
criticism of this holding, see 1 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 22.
70. (1902) 173 Mo. 257, 73 S. W. 180.
71. (1905) 193 Mo. 502, 92 S. W. 224.
72. (1915) 267 Mo. 91, 183 S. W. 580.
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ant's heirs of her body, with the same result.

Similar facts ex-

isted in Summet v. City Realty Co., 73 where the court said that
it had "uniformly held that contingent remainders are alienable
the same as are other estates."
It can no longer be doubted that a contingent remainder is an
"interest" in land within the meaning of the Missouri statute.
The early common law view of contingent remainders as mere
"possibilities" may therefore have no place in Missouri law
to-day. Indeed, both vested and contingent remainders are mere
idealities; the one no less imaginary than the other ;74 and the
time has come when both may be stripped of their feudal clothes
of uncertainty and put into a garb of substantial fiber. This
being true, it may well be doubted whether the distinction should
be continued between those contingencies which affect the person,
and those which affect the completeness of the title which is
conferred on an ascertained person.7 5
Although the Missouri
court has not expressly repudiated it, it is unlikely that it will be
respected since the decision in Brown v. Fulkerson, and it is probably safe to say. that any contingent remainder may be aliened
by deed under the statute, whether the object of the gift or limitation of the remainder be or be not ascertained.
Thus, the
Missouri court has read the explicit provision of the English
statute into Missouri law.
Of course the alienee of a contingent remainder takes it subject
to the contingency, just as the alienor had it.7M A restraint on the
alienation of a contingent remainder while it continues contingent
73. (1907) 208 Mo. 501, 106 S. W. 614. In Armor v. Lewis (1913)
252 Mo. 568, 589, 161 S. W. 251, BOND, J., dissenting, and: "That all
estates in remainder, are conveyable by the owner and available to his
creditors is uncontrovertible." The possibility of conveying a contingent remainder seems to have been overlooked in Faris v. Ewing
(1916) 183 S. W. 280, as was pointed out in a note on that case in 12
Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, 48, 50.
Equity will decree specific performance of a contract for the
sale of an alienable contingent remainder. Matter of Asch (1902) 75
App. Div. (N. Y.) 4,86.
74. See Professor Kales' valuable discussion of this point in his
book on Future Interests in Illinois, § 78.
75. See 14 Columbia Law Rev. 67.
76. aodman v. Simmons (1892) 113 Mo. 122, 132, 20 S. W. 972.
This is the explanation of Emnmerson v. Hughes (1892) 110 Mo. 627, 19
S. W. 979. It will be noted that Revised Statutes 1909, § 2822, concerning the construction of the term "real estate" has not been referred
to in this discussion. It is believed that it has no relevancy.
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is probably valid in Missouri, 77 tho it would seem that such a result is not defensible unless the non-alienation is clearly included
in the contingency itself.
Involuntary Alienation. The. seizure of land on execution
depends entirely on statute. The Missouri statute of 1835 provided that the term "real estate" as used in the act on executions
should be construed "to include all estate and interest in lands,
tenements and hereditaments, '' s and it has been continued in the
same form to the present time. 7 9 There can be no doubt that a
vested remainder is subject to execution under this statute.8 It
seems to have been thought at one time that this statute applied
only where the owner of an interest was in some way seised, 5 '
and if this view had been continued, the statute probably would
not have included contingent remainders. But in White v. McPheeters,2 where land had' been conveyed to a trustee for A
for life, remainder in fee to her husband should he survive her,
with power in A and her husband to direct a conveyance during
their joint lives, it was held that the interest of the husband
whether vested or contingent (it was plainly the latter) was
subject to his creditor's rights to reach it for satisfaction of their
debts, and that the joint deed of A and her husband, while the
latter was insolvent, was not effective to bar his creditors. While
the court was very clearly of the opinion that a contingent
remainder was subject to execution under the statute, if must be
admitted that the authority of the case on that point is weakened
by the fact that the husband and wife also had a power of
appointment, the attempted exercise of which in favor of a
volunteer rendered the property subject to the claims of his
creditors. On this ground the case was distinguished by the
"

77. Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed.) § 46.
78. Revised Statutes 1835, p. 262, § 59.
79. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2194.
80. See Dunkerson v. Goldberg (1908) 162 Fed. 120.
81. Mc~lvaine v. Smith (1867) 42 Mo. 45.
82. (1882) 75 Mo. 286. Cf., Watson v. Dodd (1873) 68 N. C. 5,28,
where a court of equity refused to order the sale of a contingent remainder, there being no apparent statutory authority; followed In
Howbert v. Cawthorn (1902) 100 Va. 649, which is criticised in 16 Harv.
Law Rev. 3,77.

See also Daniels v. Eldredge (1878)

Tiffany, Real Property, § 129.

125 Mass. 356;
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United States Supreme Court. 3 Even if White v. McPheeters
is not actual authority, there can be little doubt that a contingent
remainder is subject to execution under the Missouri statute, at
least where the person to take is ascertained; and in view of the
application of the statute on conveyances in Brown v. Fulkerson,
even where the person is not ascertained the contingent remainder may be an "interest" which is subject to execution. 4
It seems to follow from a contingent remainder's being subject to execution that it should be treated as part of the assets of a
bankrupt or insolvent. This is the prevailing view under the
Bankruptcy Act " which provides that all property which the
bankrupt "could by any means have transferred or which might
have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against
him" shall pass to the trustee in bankruptcy,86 although it may be
necessary that the person to take should be ascertained.8 7 The
question does not seem to have arisen in Missouri.
Both vested and contingent remainders may be made the subject of taxation. The collection of inheritance taxes is probably
seldom attempted until the estate vests in possession. The Missouri statute expressly provides that the collateral inheritance tax
of this state shall not be collected "until the person or persons
liable for the same shall come into actual possession." ' ,, It would
seem that an inheritance tax imposed after the creation of a
contingent remainder in a will is not collectible when the estate
vests in possession. 88
83. In Brandeis v. Cochrane (1884) 112 U. S. 344.
84. But see Roundtrce v. Roundtree (1887) 26 S. C. 450. In
Illinois, there is no doubt that a contingent remainder is not subject to execution. Kales, Future Interests in Illinois, § 80; Aetna
Lile Ins. Co. v. Hoffin (1914) 214 Fed. 928. Cf., Hill v. Hill (1914)
264 I1. 219.
85. Bankruptcy Act, § 70a (5).
86. Clowe v. Seavey (1913) 208 N. Y. 496, 47 L. R. A. 284. See also
National Park Bank v. Billings (1911) 144 App. Div. (N. Y.) 536, 14
Columbia Law Rev. 66.
87. In re Wetmore (1901) 108 Fed. 520; Goodwin v. Banks (1898)
87 Md. 425,. In Clowe v. Seavey (1913) 208 N. Y. 496, a statute made
it unnecessary that the person be ascertained. In 1 Preston, Estates,
p. 76, it is "apprehended" that a remainder to an unascertained person

is not "transferable to assignees under a commission of bankrupt."

Cf., Clarke v. Fay (1910) 205 Mass. 228.
88. Revised Statutes 1909, § 314.
89. In re Sm4th (1912) 135 N. Y. S. 240; 12 Columbia Law Rev.
727. It has been decided in Illinois that a contingent remainder Is
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PARTITION OF REMAINDERS

The partition of lands is a means of transferring interests
which may be voluntary, or compulsory.90 Voluntary partition
between contingent remaindermen may be effected by conveyances
of the contingent interests which will operate as any other conveyances, but the anomalous doctrine of parol partition probably
has no application because of the necessity that such partition
be followed by possession.'
The common law did not permit the
2
compulsory partition of estates not lying in possession.
Compulsory partition is now entirely regulated by statute.
The Missouri statute has long provided for partition "in all cases
where lands, tenements or hereditaments are held in joint tenancy,
tenancy in common, or coparcenary, including estates in fee, for
life, or for years, tenancy by the curtesy, and in dower," and any
party interested may ask "for the admeasurement and setting off
of any dower interest therein, if any, and for the partition of
the remainder, if the same can be done without great prejudice
to the parties in interest; and if not, then for the sale of the
premises and a division of the proceeds thereof among all of the
parties, according to their respective rights and interests."9 3 It
is also provided that "where any party's interest is uncertain or
contingent, or the ownership of the inheritance shall depend upon
an executory devise, or the remainder shall be contingent so
that such parties cannot be named, the same shall be so stated in
not subject to the inheritance tax in that state. People v. McCormnack
(1904) 208 Ill. 437. See also Kales, Future Interests, § 185 note.
90. Partition was spoken of as a form of alienation in Clamorgan v.
Lane (1845) 9 Mo. 442, 462.
91. Nave v. Smith (1888) 95 Mo. 596, 8 S. W. 796. See Tiffany,
Real Property, § 174.
92. Evans v. Bagshaw (1869) L. R. 8 Eq. 469, (1870) L. R. 5 Ch.
App. 340. See however Fitts v. Craddock (1906) 144 Ala. 437, 113 A.
S. R. 53; Freeman, Cotenancy and Partition (2d ed.) § 440. At common law, a tenancy in parcenary could be partitioned on a writ of
partition, but the partition of joint tenancies and tenancies in common
depended on the early statutes of 31 and 32 Henry VIII. Equity's Jurisdiction of suits for partition was later. See Gudgell v. Mead, (1843)
8 Mo. 53; Tiffany, Real Property, § 175; 4 Pomeroy, Equity (3d ed.)
§ 1387.
93. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2559, first enacted in its present form
in Revised Statutes 1865, p. 611. But the earlier statute in Revised
Statutes 1825, p. 609, was not very different.
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the petition. 9' 4 This clearly contemplates that the existence of
uncertain future interests shall be no bar to partition. To determine the extent to which contingent future interests may be
partitioned under this statute, requires a close analysis of the
cases.
I Reinders v. Koppelnann5 is the first leading case. The plaintiff was in possession as owner of an estate pur autre vie, and he
was also owner of one-fourth of one-half of the remainder; the
other half of the remainder had been devised to the "nearest and
lawful heirs" of the testator and of his widow who was still alive.
The owners of the three-fourths of the first half, the heirs of the
testator, and certain other persons denominated the "ostensible
heirs" of the testator's widow, were made defendants. The court
admitted that the heirs of the widow could not be determined
until her death, but held that under the statute above quoted their
interest constituted no bar to the partition.96 It will be observed
that the interest of the plaintiff in this case was definite and vested,
and that he also had a vested pur autre vie. The contingent
interest represented not more than one-fourth of the remainder.
94. Revised. Statutes 1909, § 2563.

The substance of thls section

first appeared in Revised Statutes 1835, p. 422, § 4. One who may contest the will and if successful take by descent, has not a contingent
interest within the meaning of the statute. Robertson v. Brown (1904)
187 Mo. 452, 86 S. W. 187. This section of the statute was apparently
overlooked in Collins v. Crawford (1908) 214 Mo. 1'67, 183, where the
court said that "all persons who are legally and equitably interested

in the subject matter and result of the suit must be made parties,
but such interest in the meaning of said rule must be a present, substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy of a future
contingent interest."
95. (1878) 68 Mo. 482. Simmons v. MacAdaras (1878) 6 Mo. App.
297, was decided about the same time as Reinders v. Koppelmann, but
it seems to have been wholly neglected in later decisions. The suit
was begun by the owner of one-third of a leasehold and one-half of
the reversion, and the lower court had ordered a sale of the property
as a whole. The St. Louis Court of Appeals held this to be error,
although leave was given to the plaintiff to ask for the separate partition of the leasehold, and of the reversion. See also Reinhardt v. Wendeck (1867) 40 Mo. 5(77. In Cornelius v. Smith (18714) 55 Mo. 528,
the court seems to have permitted partition of equitable interests which
were either wholly In remainder and vested, or subject to equitable
dower.
96. The court relied on Wills v. Slade (1801) 6 Ves. 498, Gaskell
v. Gaskell (1836) 6 Sim. Ch. 643 and Mead v. Mitchell (1858) 17 N.
Y, 210. In all of these cases there were several cotenants of vested
present estates, and the principle of representation was applied as to
the future estates.
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It is difficult to reconcile the court's statements that "the parties
not in esse are represented by those who take subject to their
rights," and that such persons not in esse cannot be made parties
to the suit "except by naming the owner of the particular estate
to which, on certain contingencies, they become entitled." The
possibility of a merger of a portion of the particular estate in the
remainder was not mentioned by court or counsel, and the case7
may be distinguished on the ground that a merger had occurred .
In Preston v: Brant,"8 it was held that partition, could be maintained by two remaindermen against the life tenant and the other
remainderman, the remainder being vested. No contingent interests were involved and the court's reliance on Reinders v. Koppelmann would seem to have been misplaced. In Atkinson v.
Brady,"" a tenant by curtesy who also owned one-fifth of the
vested remainder was permitted to maintain partition as to the
remainder against the other remaindermen; the court seemed
to rely on the phrase in the statute "for the admeasurement and
97.

It seems clear that there may be a merger in such a case.

The question of a merger pro tanto was raised but not decided in
Simmons v. MacAdaras (1878) 6 Mo. App. 297, and it might have been
raised in Burns v. Bangert (1887) 92 Mo. 167, 4 S. W. 677, and In Atkinson v. BradIy (1892) 114 Mo. 200, 21 S. W. 480, and in Llewellyn
v. Lewis (1913) 181 Mo. App. 99, 163 S:.
W. 545. If A is sole tenant for
life, with remainder to B and C in fee, and if A conveys his life estate to B, there will be a merger as to a moiety; if A and B are joint
tenants or tenants in common for life, with remainder to C in fee,
and if A conveys his estate to C, there should likewise be a merger
as to a moiety. 3 Preston, Conveyancing, p. 89; Clark v. Parsons
(1897) 69 N. H. 147; Harrison v. Moore (1894) 64 Conn. 344; Fox v.
Long (1871) 8 Bush (Ky.) 551. But see contra, Johnson v. Johnson
(1863) 7 Allen (Mass.) 196. If A and B are tenants in common for
life, remainder (without distinguishing the moieties) to C and D
in fee, and if A conveys his estate to C, there would seem to be a
merger only as to one-half of A's estate. 3 Preston, Conveyancing,
p. 100. But cf., Badeley v. Vigurs (1854) 4 E. & B. 71. It is hardly
necessary to add that a vested estate will not merge into a contingent remainder.
98. (1888) 96 Mo. 552, 10 S. W. 78. This case was followed in
Hayes v. Mcfleynolds (1898) 144 Mo. 348, 46 S. W. 161; and in Doerner
v. Doerner (1900) 161 Mo. 399, 61 S. W. 801. It is sometimes said that
the plaintiff in partition must have actual or constructive possession.
See Chamberlain v. Waples (1905) 193 Mo. 96, 91 S. W. 934. But what
is really meant is that the defendant shall not have a possession adverse to the plaintiff. See Rozier v. Griffith (1860) 31 Mo. 171. In
Rhorer v. Brockhage (1883) 13 Mo. App. 397, it was said by TnoMpsoN,
J., for the St. Louis Court of Appeals that "the statute of partition does
not contemplate the partition of reversionary interests."
99. (1892) 114 Mo. 200, 21 S. W. 480.
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setting off of any dower interest therein, if any, and for the partition of the remainder," but is may be doubted whether the word
"remainder" in this statute is to be given its artful meaning. In
remanding the case to the trial court, the Supreme Court directed
a partition "subject to the curtesy." The possibility of a merger
of one-fifth of the curtesy in the remainder was not noted. No
reason is perceived why such a merger should not have occurred,
and if it did occur the partition might have been subject to fourfifths of the curtesy.
In Sikemeier v. Galvin,100 a testator devised land to his daughter
for life and on her death to her heirs, and provided that at any
time the land might be sold "by the concurrence in the deed, as
parties, of the ostensible heirs," but that the proceeds were to be
reinvested after such sale, subject to the interests created by the
will. The daughter and one of her sisters who was a possible
heir brought suit for partition against the other sister and her
two brothers, and a demurrer by the defendants was sustained
below. This was held to be error on the authority of Reinders v.
Koppelmann, but it will be noted that since neither of the plaintiffs had a vested interest in the remainder that case was not controlling. The existence of a reversion in the testator's heirs subject to the vesting of the remainder in the daughter's heirs was
not noted; probably all the heirs of the testator were parties to
the suit. Sikemeier v. Galvin would seem to have permitted
partition by one contingent remainderman against the others, the
life tenant also being a party plaintiff. But since the parties included all of the "ostensible heirs," the authority of the case is
much weakened by the provision in the will for a conveyance by
them. The case has been explained in Stockwell v. Stockwell 101
on the ground that it was decided only that the "partition was
a mode of alienation and reinvestment to which the parties might
resort in carrying out these provisions of the will;" but it is
submitted that this explanation neglects the fact that some of
the parties were thus being forced to convey against their will.
100. (1894) 124 Mo. 367, 27 S. W. 551.
101. (1914) 262 Mo. 671, 686, 172 S. W. 23. On p. 685, the court
through Brown, C., etated that in Sikemeier v. Galvin all the "ostensible heirs" were petitionere, but this seems to be an error for the report
distinctly states that some of them were defendants and demurred.
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In Sparks v. Clay, °2 where an undivided one-fourth of a tract
of land was conveyed to A for life and remainder to her heirs,
it was held that a child of A, born after final judgment in a partition suit to which A was a party, was bound by the judgment
in that suit. A was one of the four tenants in common, two of
whom were owners of present estates in fee simple, and on the
doctrine of representation of persons not in esse as announced in
Reinders v. Koppelman A was therefore entitled to represent her
unborn children. In Acord v. Beaty, 03 the doctrine of representation of remaindermen not in esse by the owner of the particular
estate was applied to a voluntary partition between various life
tenants, which was shown to be "fair and equal when made," and
in which the deeds provided for the interests of the remaindermen.104

In Hill v. Hill,'° it was held that the partition sought would
contravene the intention of the testator, and the court's expression of disapproval of Reinders v. Koppelmann and Sikemeier v.
Galvin would seem to have been gratuitous. This led to the
decision in Stockwell v. Stockwell;'0 6 land had been conveyed to
A and her bodily heirs, and A and one of her two children sought
partition in a suit against the other. Clearly a reversion remained in the grantor subject to the vesting of the statutory remainders of the estate tail, yet neither he nor his heirs was
joined.10 7 This alone should have been sufficient for disposing of
102. (1904) 185 Mo. 393, 84 S. W. 40. Cf., Collins v. Crawford
(1908) 214 Mo. 167.
103. (1912) 244 Mo. 126, 148 S. W. 901. Cf. Coquillardv. Coquillard
(Ind. App. 1916) 113 N. U. 474. A valuable note on the doctrine of
representation was recently published in 16 Columbia Law Review 674.
104. The voluntary parol partition in Gulick v. Huntley (1898)
144 Mo. 241, 46 S. W. 154, was contrary to the provisions of the will
and hence the question of representation did not arise. A partition
will not be made where It would defeat a testator's intention. Revised
Statutes 1909, § 2569; Cubbage v. Franklin (1876) 62 Mo. 364; Stevens
v. De La Vaulx (1901) 166 Mo. 20; Stewart v. Jones (1909) 219 Mo.
614, 118 S.W. 1. Cf. Barnard v. Keathley (1910) 230 Mo. 209, 224,
130 S. W. 306; Shelton v. Bragg (1916) 189 S. W. 1175.
105. (1914) 261 Mo. 55, 168 S. W. 1165.
106. (1914) 262 Mo. 671, 172 S. W. 23. In so far as it attempts a
history of estates tail in Missouri, the opinion in this case is grossly
inadequate. See 1 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 11.
107. The grantor was doubtless dead, although the fact does not
clearly appear except in the objection that his heirs were not joined.
On the effect of a failure to join parties having vested interests in a
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the case; but the court expressed the opinion that the contingent
interests were not susceptible of partition. The attempt to explain
the decision in Sikemeier v. Galvin, is not convincing, 10 8 and if it
were not for the fact that the result may clearly be rested on the
failure to join all necessary parties, the decision would have the
effect of overruling that case.
The most recent case, decided since this study was begun, is
A testator devised land to his daughter,
Shelton v. Bragg. 0
Arcelia, for her "to use, occupy and enjoy during her natural
life," and directed, that upon her death the land "or the proceeds
thereof" should be divided among his five other children "or their
heirs" and the heirs of Arcelia. During the continuance of the
life estate, the life tenant and two other children of the testator
sought partition of the land devised, alleging that Arcelia tho
long married had never had any children, and on account of her
health did not expect to have any. The remaining three children
of the testator were made defendants, but one of them had conveyed his interest to another. It may be assumed that the heirs
of Arcelia were to have only one sixth of the remainder, tho
this was not clearly provided. Since Arcelia had given up having
children (her age does not appear), her brothers and sisters were
her ostensible heirs within the meaning of that term as it was used
in Reinders v. Koppelmann and Sikemeier v. Galvin, and all of
them were parties. Furthermore, Arcelia as a party might conceivably have represented her unborn children under the doctrine
of Sparks v. Clay. The five-sixths of the remainder given to the
other five children must have been contingent on their surviving
Arcelia, for it was given, to them "or their heirs"; unless or be
read as and," 0 for which there seems to be no reason in this case,
all of 'the remainder was contingent."' The reversion pending
partition proceeding, see Hiles v. Rule (189a) 121 Mo. 248, 25 S. W. 959;
Cochran v. Thomas (1895.) 131 Mo. 258, 33 S. W. 6.
108. See ante, p. 26.
109. (1916) 189 S. W. 1174.
110. While "or and and are not treated as interchangable in
judicial exposition," Eckle v. Ryland (1913) 256 Mo. 424, they may
be interchanged to effectuate a testator's intention. Maguire v. Moore,
(1891) 108 Mo. 267, 273; Owen v. Eaton (1893) 56 Mo. App. 563. See
also White v. Crawford (1813) 10 Mass. 183.
111. In Young v. Hyde (1913) 255 Mo. 509, the court seemed to
be willing to adjudicate a title in disregard of the common law rule
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the vesting of the remainder was probably in the parties as heirs
of the testator, no residuary devise appearing. The situation was
therefore very similar to that in Sikemeier v. Galvin, and on the
authority of that case a partition might have been allowed. But
the Supreme Court reversed the decree of partition rendered by
the circuit court for two reasons: first, because a partition would
be contrary to the will of the testator; second, apparently, because the interests were not subject to partition under Stockwell
v. Stockwell. As to this second ground, Stockwell v. Stockwell
was not controlling unless the reversioners were not parties. The
court's quotation of the gratuitous condemnation of Sikeinvier
v. Galvin, made in Hill v. Hill and previously quoted in Stockwell
v. Stockwell, indicates that Sikemeier v. Galvin is to be wholly
abandoned. The decision in Shelton v. Bragg may be rested,
however, on the testator's intention that there should be no partition.
It is apparent from this review of the decisions that the last
word has not been spoken concerning the partition of remainders.
In the simple case where A is tenant for life, with remainder to
B and his heirs, neither A nor B is entitled to partition for there
is in no sense a contenancy. Where A and B are tenants for the
life of A, remainder to C and his heirs, either A or B may partition without in any way affecting the remainder. If A owns
one-half of the tract in fee, the other half being vested in B for
life, remainder to B's heirs, either A or B may have partition and
B would represent his heirs sufficiently to bind them; if the
remainder is to the heirs of C, B as tenant of the particular
2
estate may possibly represent C's heirs so as to bind them."
Where A. is sole tenant for life, with the remainder in fee vested
in B and C, Preston v. Brant would seem to permit either B or C
to maintain partition against the other and A may be joined as
a party, although it seems clear that A's interest would not necesthat a living person is never to be deemed incapable of having issue,
basing its decision on the "physical impossibility" of the birth of
children.
112. In Betz v. Farling (1916) 274 Ill. 107, A and B were tenants
in common for their respective lives, with remainders as to the share
of each to his surviving children and if one left no surviving child,
remainder to the children of the other. A died leaving children one
of whom was permitted to maintain partition against the others and
B and his living children.
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sarily be affected in such a case."'a If A is sole tenant for life
and owner of a part of a vested remainder, 11 4 it would seem
that he may maintain partition as to the remainder against the
other owners of the remainder, if their interests are vested ;115
and if their interests are contingent Reinders v. Koppelmann
would seem to permit partition wherever the principle of representation of persons not in es.se can be applied; but the authority
of that decision is weakened since the decisions in Hill v. -Jill
and Stockwell v. Stockwell, and the narrowing of its doctrine
may now be expected. If A is tenant for life, with a contingent
remainder to other persons, it would seem folly to permit any
partition even though A be joined as a party, and Sikemeier v.
Galvin is to be confined to its actual facts if indeed it is not to be
abandoned altogether since the decisions of Stockwell v. Stockwell
and Shelton v. Bragg; if A is not joined, and if one possible remainderman seeks partition against the others, clearly it should be
denied because of the interest of the reversioners; nor should
partition be decreed if the reversioners are joined, for there can be
no definite basis for division pending the contingency and if a sale
were decreed the whole proceeding would be idle in that no advance is made toward division. 16
Originally the object of partition was to enable cotenants to
enjoy peaceful possession. It was distinctly a remedy to facili113. See also Hayes v. McReynolds (1898) 144 Mo. 348, 46 S. W. 1:61.
Cf., Doerner v. Doerner (1900) 161 Mo. 399, 61 S. W. 801. The general
rule in other states is contra. See 32 A. S. R. 780. In Haeussler v. Missouri Iron Co. (1892) 110 Mo. 188, 19 S. W. 75, partition was decreed
subject to a perpetual mining lease. In Beckner v. McLinn (1891) 107
Mo. 277, 17 S. W. 819, a homestead was included in the partition sale

under the statutory provision.

114. If the court were pressed to decide that there is a merger in

such a case, the result of the partition suit would probably be the same.
In Jameson v. Hayward (1895) 106 Cal. 682, there were several owners

of a term and one of them owned the reversion; the court ordered a
partition of the term only, leaving the reversion unaffected and ignoring the merger on equitable grounds.
115. Atkinson v. Brady (1892) 114 Mo. 200, 21 S. W. 480.
116. This has been recognized by the Illinois court which has per-

sistently refused to permit partition of remainders after a life estate
where the interests of the remaindermen could not be definitely ascertained until the death of the life tenant. Seymour v. Bowles (1898)
172 Ill. 521; Ruddell v. Wren (1904) 208 I1. 508.

And partition was

recently refused where the remainder was "vested in quality" but "contingent in quantity."

Richardson v. Vanuundy (1916) 271 Ill. 476.
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tate the enjoyment of present estates in possession. But the
broad terms of the Missouri statute seem to have authorized its
extension to such future interests as vested remainders although
the actual step was taken in Reinders v. Koppclmann and Preston
v. Brant apparently without appreciation of its significance. But
it seems undesirable that this principle should be extended to
permit the partition of contingent future interests, and Stockwell
v. Stockwell therefore represents a proper disposition to restrict
Reinders v. Koppelmann.
MANLEY 0. HUDSON.

